Pakistan has no comprehensive state policy or a consistent plan for state action in place to fight the menace of religious extremism. There have been hardly any vigorous attempts by the state to counter the religious-extremist worldview and the actions it inspires. Most current manifestations of extremism are related to an Islamic conception of jihad for the establishment of a purportedly Islamic state. The police, the primary law enforcers in the country, bear the heaviest burden in fighting this foe.
The police force is so seriously hobbled by problems of policy, organization and capacity that it is barely able to cope with this threat. If extremism is to be effectively tackled in Pakistan, the police have to be substantially strengthened and the factors debilitating it removed.
Despite the surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2005, there has been no consistent effort to address the roots of the problem. These attacks spiked in 2009 and while they appeared to recede in 2011, the frequency remains worryingly high. Terrorist attacks are not new to Pakistan, and per one estimate, there have been at least 4,438 attacks in the country between 1974 and 2010.1 Fatality figures vary, but according to one estimate, over 40,000 have been killed in terrorist attacks between 2003 and 2012.2
Table 1 presents data on legal action taken against extremism. The data, from the Punjab province, shows cases registered by the police during the last four years. While looking at these figures, it is important to keep in mind that these were the worst years for the entire country in terms of terrorist incidents.3
Table 1: Action against Extremism in Punjab, Some Indicators
| Cases registered | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
| Amplifier Ordinance | 3,060 | 3,760 | 4,207 | 5,396 |
| Objectionable speech | 6 | 16 | 8 | 14 |
| Objectionable books | 1 | 5 | 11 | 14 |
| Wall chalking | 2 | 8 | 12 | 17 |
| Sectarian POs wanted | NA | 63 | 71 | 111 |
| Sectarian POs arrested | NA | 0 | 1 | 0 |
It is inconceivable that there were only a handful of incidents involving objectionable books or speeches in the whole of Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province, during this time. The data reflects the lack of action against the factors driving extremism, militancy and terrorism. The consequences of this lack of action are apparent in the mushroom growth of Islamist jihadi groups in Pakistan.
On the other hand, there has been a steady increase in the number of cases related to blasphemy, and other such legal action affecting mostly minorities or under-privileged groups and individuals. Table 2 shows the number of registered cases under the head of blasphemy has been rising for the last five years across Pakistan. The bulk of these cases were registered in Punjab (77 percent – 85 percent of the total cases) and Sindh (13 percent and 22 percent of the total cases). This shows that the protection provided in the law against abuse is not effective as there is no evidence of actual incidents of blasphemy in such a consistent manner.4
The assessment above is supported by data collected by the Jinnah Institute this year. It is clear that the level of protection for minorities is deteriorating while action against extremism is far from satisfactory.
Table 2: Reported Blasphemy Cases
| Area | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
| Punjab | 107 | 140 | 159 | 238 | 244 |
| Sindh | 24 | 26 | 53 | 49 | 37 |
| KPK | 0 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Balochistan | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Islamabad | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GilgitBaltistan | 5 | 3 | 12 | 6 | 1 |
| AJK | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 138 | 175 | 232 | 295 | 287 |
The obvious question at this juncture is: why is the police not acting? The following analysis delineates the challenges faced by extremism and tries to explain this traditional lack of action.
1. Institutional Atrophy
It can be reasonably argued that lack of police action has in large part been caused by the state itself when it supported the policy of supporting mujahideen in Afghanistan and then in Kashmir. This meant that even in matters of internal security, for which police are primarily responsible, the police were effectively told to have a hands-off approach. The actions of state actors were driven more by a strategic imperative and much less by the need to keep internal peace and harmony.
The results of this policy have been met with deliberate negligence of any negative consequences of extremist ideologies. The police was not allowed or expected to take action against objectionable speeches, incendiary literature or recruitment efforts. In fact, these were covertly supported by the state in many cases. Perhaps an unintended but foreseeable corollary in not allowing the police to take any action against such activities is that it has now become an accepted practice to ignore such issues until it is too late. The conscious policy of protecting Islamist groups (even when they were involved in serious breaches of the law) and some political parties in the past has meant a diffidence on the part of the police in taking vigorous action even though there are public statements about taking serious action against extremism. This reluctance is because of the past experience of the police as an institution and part of it is due to the collective atrophy of police capacity.
2. Police Capacity for Action
Even though it is clear from international experience that police action is one the most effective tools to fight terrorism and insurgencies, the preferred methods in Pakistan have historically been other than police action.5 A big reason for this has been a lack of police capacity and an absence of attention to strengthening the police despite an obvious need for police reform.6
The capacity issues of the police are manifold and well- documented.7 These include a paucity of trained investigative staff to tackle complex cases, the absence of advanced intelligence/analysis capability, no access to modern information sources like mobile phone data as well as financial transactions, a lack of modernization, and a reputation for corruption and inefficiency.
These inadequacies are exacerbated by a system that rewards politically connected officials at the expense of efficient ones. This reduces the operational autonomy of the senior police leadership due to interventions by a host of outside actors. Even where the police want to take action, they would be seriously hampered by these capacity constraints.
3. A Besieged Police Force
Described as ‘the negotiated state’, Pakistan has historically been a weak one.8 The last few years have seen the fortunes of the traditional centers of state authority in Pakistan plummet to new lows, in no small measure due to an ascendant media and a newly proactive judiciary. The police force in particular has been at the receiving end of this new development. It has been frequently targeted by the media, the judiciary and other organized groups like bar associations. Traditionally symbolizing the authority of the colonial state, ordinary people cheer on the courts and the media when the police is humiliated and mocked. What the police force is going through can be gauged from the data below on the Punjab Police.9
A police force that has to face more than 1,400 criminal cases in one year while performing its duties, and where five percent of the total force was awarded major penalties within nine months, cannot be expected to be in a normal state of mind. The morale within the police department has been adversely affected, their self-image is very low and there is virtually no pride in doing a vital job.
The police force is so defensive that it is now very reluctant to take any action even where the situation warrants it. This reflects most adversely in the police department’s work in protecting the vulnerable sections of society. Such a beleaguered force cannot perform its duties adequately.
There have been some attempts to change the pattern of cases registered against police officers by requesting an inquiry before a case is registered. However, there has been limited success in this venture as the regulations require for this process have not been brought in place in any province except Sindh. Police officers say that their work can only be done if there is an independent police complaint commission in place for inquiries.
Table 3: Cases against Police Officers in Punjab 2011
| Registered | Cancelled | Challenged | |
| Criminal Cases | 654 | 255 | 230 |
| Cases under 155 Police Order | 751 | 248 | 232 |
| Dismissal/ Removal from service/ Retirement | 2,561 |
| Forfeiture of Service | 4,245 |
| Reduction in Pay or Rank | 372 |
| TOTAL | 7,178 |
4. Attacks on Police Officers
The last few years have been very challenging for law enforcement agencies due to an onslaught of terrorist attacks on them. The police, being a symbol of state authority, make a prominent target for terrorists. The following charts highlight the extent of the security problem for the police.10
Figure 1: Attacks on Police (excluding bomb blasts)
Figure 2: Number of Police Officers Killed (excluding bomb blasts)
The number of attacks on police has consistently increased during the last five years. Hundreds of police officials have been killed or injured in the line of duty each year. Faced with these challenges, it is a daunting task for the police force to take vigorous action against extremist elements without a clear policy of support for the department. A police force sees the state not caring for it and frequently abandoning it in critical situations can hardly be expected to adopt a forceful stance against powerful extremist forces.
Realizing the inadequacy of the compensation being offered to police officials killed in the line of duty, and the adverse effect on police morale, provincial governments have now revised the compensation packages. The package now includes a one- time cash compensation of Rs. 3 million (around 30,000 US dollars) to the family as well as continuation of salary to the widow and the family until the normal retirement age of the police official.
Figure 3: Police Officers Injured in Attacks (excluding bomb blasts)
Pakistan has a specific law to deal with extremism and terrorism, but it is inadequate in many ways. The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA 1997) was enacted federally and applies nationally except for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Two serious points of criticism have been leveled on the law. The first is that it is too broad and does not have sufficient safeguards against abuse of the special provisions it contains. The other is that it is ineffective in achieving its objective, i.e. punishing terrorists.12
The provisions in the law dealing with the factors leading to terrorism are inadequate as well . Cases against objectionable texts as well as hateful speeches have to be registered under the ATA, but procedure and evidence-related matters are regulated by ordinary laws on the subject (the Criminal Procedure Code and the Qanun-i-Shahadat Order). The Evidence Act requires that there is oral testimony against someone to prove the charges. In a case of producing hate materials, for instance, the difficulty of proving (through oral evidence of an eyewitness) that a person wrote the material and distributed it is obvious. The situation is further complicated by the absence of a witness protection program, and the fact that the persons producing such hate material usually belong to dangerous organizations with a reputation for resorting to violence whenever required.
This is a slightly edited reprint of the article of the same title in Extremism Watch – Mapping Conflict Trends in Pakistan 2011-2012 (Islamabad: Jinnah Institute, 2013), pages 48-53. The whole report is available at: www.jinnah-institute.org/publications.
Mr. Zulfiqar Hameed is a senior police officer with extensive experience in investigation as well as operation of police. He has worked on important terrorism investigations while posted as Senior Superintendent of Police investigations in Lahore.
For further information, please contact: Jinnah Institute, Islamabad Office, ph (92 51) 2814161-63; fax (92 51) 2814164 e-mail: info@jinnah-institute.org; www.jinnah-institute.org/.
1. University of Maryland USA. (n.d.). Global Terrorism Data-base. Retrieved 10 November 2012, from START Project: www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casulaties=type=&casualties_,ax=&country=153
2. Ibid.; South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Retrieved 17 November 2012, from Pakistan Data Sheets: www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html.;Investigation Branch, Punjab Police, Annual Crime Figures (Lahore: Punjab Police, 2011)
3. Seth G. Jones, M.C., How Terrorist Groups End (Arlington, Virginia: Rand Corporation, 2008). See also Sepp, K.I., “Best Practices in Counter- insurgency,” Military Review, 2005, May-June, pages 8-12.
4. Abbas, H., Reforming Pakistan’s police and law enforcement infrastructure. (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011).
5. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s police (Brussels/Islamabad: International Crisis Group, 2008).
6. Fair, C.C., “Policing Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal Asia, 30 June 2009.
7. Lieven, A., Pakistan A hard country (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
8. Investigation Branch, Punjab Police, op. cit.
9. National Police Bureau, Annual Crime Figures (Islamabad: National Police Bureau, Government of Pakistan, 2012).
10. Hameed, Z., “The anti-terrorism law of Pakistan: Need for reform,” Social Science and Policy Bulletin, 2-9, 2012.
11. Amnesty International, Pakistan Legalizing the impermissible: The new anti-terrorism law (London: Amnesty International,
1997).
12. Hameed, Z. “Anti Terrorism Law,” in Hassan Abbas, editor, Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform (New York: Asia Society, 2012) pages 49-56.