The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster March 2011 was a devastating and unprecedented event in Japan's history. More than 470,000 people were displaced at the height of the triple disaster. While the majority of these displaced persons have since returned home or settled elsewhere, thousands of people displaced by the nuclear disaster continue to face uncertain future due to fears over radiation and its uncertain long-term impacts on health, and concerns over access to basic services.
As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the author visited the country from 26 September to 7 October 2022 with the agreement of the government of Japan. During the visit, she held meetings in Tokyo and travelled to the prefectures of Fukushima, Hiroshima and Kyoto. The objective of the visit was to assess the human rights situation of IDPs - also known as "evacuees" in Japan - of the Fukushima Daichii nuclear disaster that followed the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami in 2011. She met current government officials at different levels, former officials in charge of the response to the triple disaster, as well as IDPs, lawyers and members of the civil society. Her report is being presented at the Human Rights Council session in June in Geneva, Switzerland.
General Conclusions
The following are edited excerpts of the conclusions and recommendations of the author as UN Special Rapporteur.[1]
In the face of an unprecedented disaster, Japan is to be commended for the rapidity and scale of its emergency response, establishment of multiple channels for IDPs to claim compensation, and support to IDPs in the aftermath of the disaster provided by national and prefectural authorities. However, protection and assistance measures - notably housing assistance and compensation for emotional distress - have diminished over time as the authorities shift focus to reconstruction and reopening the prefecture, despite associated human rights challenges. Evacuees who prefer to remain in displacement, particularly "voluntary" evacuees who received less support, feel under financial and social pressure to return.
All evacuees from Fukushima prefecture, whether displaced by evacuation order or fear of the nuclear disaster's effects, are IDPs with the same rights. All IDPs have the right to an informed and voluntary decision on what durable solution to pursue, which emanates from the right to freedom of movement and residence.[2] The Guiding Principles establish the rights of all IDPs to seek safety in another part of the country and to be protected against forcible return to any place where their life or health would be at risk, and that governments bear the primary duty and responsibility of ensuring conditions that allow IDPs to return voluntarily, safely, and in dignity, or to resettle voluntarily elsewhere. The safety and equal protection of all Japanese citizens is guaranteed under the Constitution.
The IASC [Inter-Agency Standing Committee] Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons obliges authorities to ensure that IDPs can exercise this choice without coercion, including inter alia tacit forms of coercion such as the provision of erroneous and deliberately misleading information, making assistance conditional on specific choices, and setting arbitrary time limits to end assistance before the minimum conditions conducive for durable solutions are established.[3] In this light, providing only reassuring information on radiation, disbursing more generous assistance to returnees than those in displacement, and ending assistance to displaced IDPs before conditions are fully conducive to return run contrary to international law standards and infringe upon IDPs' rights to evacuation and to a durable solution of their choice.
In the context of the Fukushima disaster, many IDPs remain reluctant to return given levels of radiation with uncertain long-term impacts, the lack of livelihood, education, health, and essential services in areas of return, and the limited extent of decontamination, which are challenges that also impact the human rights of IDPs who do return. Addressing these issues rather than papering over them is critical to ensure the durability of return of the IDPs. At the same time, it is important to recognize that many IDPs may exercise their right to settle permanently elsewhere in Japan. These IDPs should not face discrimination for this choice and should receive support and compensation - on equal terms, regardless of whether their displacement was "voluntary" or "mandatory" - to enable their settlement.
As an overall recommendation, the Special Rapporteur urges the government of Japan to categorically adopt a human-rights-based approach to protection, humanitarian assistance, and durable solutions for all persons internally displaced by the Fukushima disaster, with a particular focus on those who remain in evacuation.
Underlying this, the Special Rapporteur strongly recommends that the discriminatory distinction between so-called "mandatory" and "voluntary" IDPs be completely eliminated in all administrative and legal policies and their actual implementation.
In line with Japan's international human rights commitments, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, the Special Rapporteur reiterates other recommendations to address the specific human rights challenges faced by displaced persons from Fukushima, notably on the right to health, the right to family life, the right to housing, the right to information, and the like. The Special Rapporteur also expresses grave concerns concerning the human rights of specific groups among the IDPs, especially children, women, persons with disabilities and older persons.
Moving Beyond Reconstruction
Lastly, the Special Rapporteur recommends a policy of moving beyond reconstruction, specifically the need for a rights-based approach:
Since 2014, the government has begun lifting evacuation orders based on the following three criteria: i. the annual cumulative radiation dose estimated based on the air dose rate should not exceed 20 millisieverts (mSv); ii. infrastructure and essential services should be re-established in the area concerned; and iii. consultations are held between the Government of Japan, prefecture, municipalities, and residents.[4] These criteria and their implementation are problematic in several aspects.
Under the guidelines of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), in "normal, planned exposure situations", the 20 mSv standard is only applicable to adults with occupational exposure to radiation - for example, nuclear power plant workers - while the recommended maximum radiation dose for the general public is 1 mSv per year,[5] which is also the civilian limit under Japanese law but only applied to areas not affected by the disaster.[6] Many oppose using the 20 mSv standard for civilians, especially children who are more susceptible to radiation.
The government maintains that the situation in Fukushima still constitutes an "emergency exposure situation," which under ICRP guidelines from 2007 would allow a reference level of 20-100mSv.[7] The government informed the Special Rapporteur that out of an abundance of caution, the lowest level within the emergency exposure range was selected as the maximum exposure threshold for areas where evacuation orders are lifted. However, per the ICRP's latest guidance on radiological protection in the event of a large nuclear accident, during the "long-term phase,"[8] the updated reference level for exposure is "20 mSv per year or below" only in "a restricted area not open to the public."[9] For public areas where protective actions are implemented, the reference level is "the lower half of the 1-20mSv per year band."[10]
On the second criteria, the Special Rapporteur was informed in Futaba town, where evacuation orders have been partially lifted since 2020, that no school or hospital exists, although the resumption of such essential services is meant to precede the lifting of evacuation orders. It is conceivable that other evacuation orders have been lifted without these services in place. Finally, many IDPs reported that "consultations" related to the lifting of evacuation orders consisted largely of the authorities' informing stakeholders of their preconceived plans to lift the evacuation order, rather than seeking consent or allowing them to shape the process.
The lifting of evacuation orders is problematically tied to the cessation of assistance to IDPs remaining in evacuation. The Interim Guidelines outline that no further compensation will be provided for mental anguish or evacuation-related expenses after a "reasonable period following the lifting, etc. of an evacuation instruction;"[11] the Fourth Supplement clarifies that this "reasonable period" is set at one year as a benchmark.[12] "Mandatory" evacuees thus lose housing assistance from Fukushima Prefecture one year after the lifting of evacuation orders on their area of origin. "Voluntary" evacuees have lost this assistance since March 2017. Meanwhile, there are financial incentives for those who return. Fukushima Prefecture informed the Special Rapporteur that returnees receive between JPY 50,000-100,000 for residential fees. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement specify that IDPs must be able to voluntarily choose whether to return to their areas of origin or settle elsewhere, and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs specifies that this choice must be made without coercion, including tacit coercion such as "making assistance conditional on specific choices" or "setting arbitrary time limits to end assistance."[13] The Special Rapporteur believes that policies that end assistance to those in displacement while continuing assistance to returnees may amount to such coercion.
Reconstruction efforts appear to be funded at the expense of support to IDPs who do not wish to return. Fukushima Prefecture informed the Special Rapporteur that the cessation of housing support to evacuees outside the prefecture was financially necessary as the cost was no longer tenable. However, significant investments continue to be made in projects of unclear relevance to IDPs and Fukushima residents. The Fukushima Innovation Coast Framework has been estimated to cost billions of Japanese Yen annually,[14] yet many IDPs and experts expressed scepticism that IDPs and Fukushima residents would benefit from this knowledge-economy project, given that the primary economic sectors pre-disaster were agriculture and fisheries, though the government notes that the project may benefit those who were previously in Fukushima's nuclear industry. Some municipal authorities had not heard of the project when asked, and one survey found that 83.4 per cent of the prefecture's residents were not aware of what it was.[15]
Reconstruction policies appear have expanded from primarily targeting IDP returnees and disaster-affected residents of Fukushima Prefecture and towards attracting new residents. "Promotion of migration and settlement of new residents" is now an explicit goal for the Reconstruction Agency.[16] The 2019 revision of the Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake acknowledges that "considering the intentions of residents, it is difficult to achieve the reconstruction and revitalization of the area simply by promoting the return of residents" and that "for this reason, actions shall be taken...such as promoting relocation...in addition to development of an environment that allows residents to return home."[17] The 2021 revision of this policy echoes the need to "promote the migration and settlement of new residents and expand the non-resident population in addition to continuing efforts to rebuild and dispel rumours."[18]
Hereby, the government rightly acknowledges that a significant number of displaced residents of Fukushima Prefecture do not wish to return. Instead of focusing on the prefecture's repopulation, the Special Rapporteur recommends prioritizing measures to ensure IDPs who do not wish to return can achieve a durable solution outside the Prefecture while residents of and returnees to Fukushima Prefecture can enjoy the full spectrum of their human rights. Once the restitution of disaster victims is achieved, measures to attract new residents to the prefecture may be appropriate. This requires a rights-based approach to recovery, including positive measures to address the ongoing human rights challenges confronting IDPs.
Cecilia Jimenez-Damary was appointed for two terms as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) covering the 2016-2022 period.
For further information, please contact: Cecilia Jimenez, the Philippines; e-mail: sr.hr.idps@gmail.com.
[1] See Visit to Japan - Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, A/HRC/53/35/Add.1, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F53%2F35%2FADD.1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. See also, Comments by the State, A/HRC/53/35/Add.3, 23 May 2023, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G23/107/18/PDF/G2310718.pdf?OpenElement, and the Human Rights Council Hears that at the End of 2022, over 71 Million People Worldwide Were Internally Displaced Due to Conflict, Violence, Disaster, Climate Change and Human Rights Abuses, 04 July 2023, www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/07/human-rights-council-hears-end-2022-over-71-million-people-worldwide-were-internally.
[2] IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, April 2010, page 12, available at
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2021-03/IASC%20Framework%20on%20Durable%20Solutions%20for%20Internally%20Displaced%20Persons%2C%20April%202010.pdf.
[3] Ibid., page 18.
[4] Designation of Areas under Evacuation Orders, Ministry of the Environment, www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/rhm/basic-info/1st/09-04-01.html.
[5] Dose limits, ICRPædia, http://icrpaedia.org/Dose_limits.
[6] A/HRC/23/41/Add. 3, para. 46.
[7] ICRP, 2007. The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
[8] This begins "when authorities consider that the damaged facility is secured" and "have made their decisions concerning the future affected areas and have decided to allow residents, who wish to do so, to stay permanently in these areas."
[9] ICRP, 2020. Radiological protection of people and the environment in the event of a large nuclear accident: update of ICRP Publications 109 and 111, paras. 176, 190, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/ANIB_49_4.
[10] Ibid., Table 6.1, page 78.
[11] NEA, OECD, Japan's Compensation System for Nuclear Damage, pages 130, 135, www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_14806/japan-s-compensation-system-for-nuclear-damage?details=true.
[12] NEA, OECD, Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 94, 2014, page 151, www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_14888#page=151.
[13] IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, page 18.
[14] See福島イノベーション・コースト構想関連予算について（復興特会における令和２年度概算要求）令和元年 11 月 復興庁 (Budget related to the Fukushima Innovation Coast Scheme
[Fiscal year 2020 budget request in the Reconstruction Special Account] November 2019, Reconstruction Agency), www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/committee/innovation/bunkakai/04_191125_shiryou2.pdf.
福島イノベーション・コースト構想関連予算（復興特会における平成 31 年度概算要求）
平成 30 年 12 月 復興庁 (Budget related to the Fukushima Innovation Coast Initiative) [Fiscal year 2019 budget request in the Reconstruction Special Committee] December 2018, Reconstruction Agency), www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu/committee/innovation/bunkakai/05_20181203_shiryo2-2.pdf.
[15] Shunji Matsuoka, "Reconstruction Under Nuclear Disaster and Making Resilient Society in Fukushima" (Sustainable Development Disciplines for Society, Springer, Singapore, 2023), page 26.
[16] Reconstruction Agency, "Status of Reconstruction and Reconstruction Efforts," December 2022, www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/English_December_2022_genjoutorikumi.pdf.
[17] Reconstruction Agency, "Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake After the "Reconstruction and Revitalization Period" (Provisional translation)," December 2019, page 34, www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Laws_etc/2019Dec_basic-guidelines_full-text.pdf.
[18] 復興・創生期間」後における東日本大震災からの復興の基本方針の変更について[令和3年3月9日閣議決定 (Changes to the Basic Policy on Recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake after the "Reconstruction and Revitalization Period" [Cabinet Decision on March 9, 2021]), Reconstruction Agency, www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat12/sub-cat12-1/20210311135501.html.