Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is currently home to about seventy-five million people, with about 12 percent of the population being elderly. Over the past two decades, the region has faced significant economic challenges exacerbated by widespread labor migration. This migration has introduced further socio-economic difficulties, particularly impacting the elderly population who are often left behind and deprived of essential support systems.
There are different thresholds and internationally accepted standards of age at which people start to be considered elderly, typically ranging from 60 to 65. However, when considering the socio-economic context, the most relevant age threshold for defining people as elderly is the age beyond retirement, which varies from country to country in Central Asia. For men, the lowest retirement age is in Turkmenistan (62 years), and the highest is in Uzbekistan (65 years). For women, the lowest retirement age is in Turkmenistan (57 years), and the highest is in Kazakhstan (61 years), according to current legislation.
As of 2024, the combined population aged 60 and above in the five Central Asian states is about nine million (UN DESA, 2024), and around 8.9 million of them are registered as pensioners entitled to pension benefits from the state (Ministries of Social Protection of Central Asian states, 2024). Despite the small number of pensioners relative to the total population, the economic well-being of the elderly in the region remains highly concerning due to low amount of pension and high inflation rates over the past several years. For instance, the average pension in Tajikistan in 2024 is around 400 somoni (approximately 37.30 US dollars), the lowest among all former Soviet states. Other countries in the region, such as Uzbekistan with an average pension of 86.80 US dollars and Kyrgyzstan with an average pension of 107.10 US dollars, have the second and third lowest pension rates in the entire post-Soviet space (Ministries of Social Protection of Central Asian states, 2024). These low pension rates imply that a significant share of the elderly population in these countries is exposed to conditions of poverty and extreme poverty. It should be admitted that the governments of these countries were rather active in raising the social benefits and pensions in recent years. However, given the high inflation rates that have hit the region over the past several years, the socio-economic well-being of the elderly in Central Asian countries has become increasingly challenging in recent times. On the other hand, the degree of exposure of the elderly to poverty is not uniform across the region. Kazakhstan has relatively decent pension levels compared to the other countries in the region. Turkmenistan also has somewhat higher pensions according to official statistics; however, the accuracy of these statistics from this highly isolationist country is questionable.
Table 1. Number of pensioners and average level of pension benefits in countries of Central Asia in 2024 measured in current US dollars
|
|
Kazakhstan |
Kyrgyzstan |
Tajikistan |
Turkmenistan |
Uzbekistan |
|
Average pension (USD) |
295.2 |
107.1 |
37.3 |
201.3 |
86.8 |
|
Minimal pension (USD) |
128.8 |
79.0 |
23.3 |
143.1 |
51.1 |
|
Number of pensioners (thousand people) |
2,354.0 |
762.0 |
796.1 |
524.3 |
4,470.0 |
Source: Data sourced from the Ministries of Labor and Social Security of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Labor Migration and the Elderly
As it has been for many years, the labor migration of youth and the high dependency of some Central Asian states on remittances constitute a complex issue affecting various aspects of life in these countries. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are particularly dependent on remittances. For instance, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, remittances from labor migrants made up about 10 percent of Uzbekistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 30 percent of the GDP of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (ADB, 2023). This pattern is less prevalent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan, the relatively higher income levels reduce the need for labor migration, while in Turkmenistan, strict restrictions on travel abroad limit the movement of its workforce abroad. The remittances sent to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from incomes earned abroad play a crucial role in the economies of these countries, including alleviating poverty among the elderly. The real effect of the remittances on elderly welfare in these countries is hardly quantifiable, as remittances are often transferred through informal channels and redistributed within households.
It is commonly believed that altruism motive prevails in sending remittances in which migrant workers send money back to their home country primarily out of concern and care for their family members and relatives. This concept is based on multiple observations when remittances inflows increase with age dependency ratio (number of dependents aged 0 to 14 and over 65, compared to the total population aged 15 to 64), consistent with the altruism motive such as supporting children and elderly. However, in the case of some of the Central Asian countries, the final effect of remittances might appear somewhat debatable especially in recent periods.
Despite the fact that regions with the poorest economies and highest unemployment rates are the primary sources of migrant workers (Cabar.asia, 2021), the overall effect of remittances on alleviating poverty in Central Asia may be very limited in the long run. One possible reason is that labor migrants come from families that are not at the extreme end of poverty, and thus long-term labor migration may not benefit the poorest section of the population. Moreover, most migrant workers prefer to resettle permanently in Russia after years of labor migration, which does not lead to the eradication of the root causes of poverty (Nawaz Kayani, 2022). This can lead to further stratification between rich and poor households, impacting the elderly population, as they often cannot rely on state pensions and depend on the younger generation for support.
Extended periods of labor migration have prompted workers to settle permanently in Russia rather than move back and forth (Nawaz Kayani, 2022). For instance, since 2016, over eight hundred thousand citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have received Russian passports, the vast majority of whom are migrant workers living in Russia (Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2024). The number of holders of Russian passports from these countries has been rapidly rising over the past several years, up until 2023. Understanding the effects of these trends on the elderly in these countries is challenging and requires extensive research. However, acquiring a Russian passport usually implies that working-age migrants resettle in Russia along with their family members, which negatively affects the elderly. Unlike the younger generation, elderly people are usually reluctant to move to another country due to health issues, inability to receive their state pension abroad, social bonds, climate, and other factors. However, staying in their home country weakens social bonds with their children and grandchildren living abroad and causing socio-emotional stress.
One of the risks stemming from massive labor migration from countries like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan is that it is primarily concentrated in Russia. It should be admitted though that precise and reliable statistics on the number of migrant workers in Russia are lacking. According to United Nations (UN) estimates from 2019, there are probably more than eleven million labor migrants in Russia, the majority from former Soviet Central Asian countries (UN, 2019). Around 63 percent of all labor migrants from Central Asia worked in Russia in 2020 (UN DESA, 2020). Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, subsequent international sanctions and economic hardships might have decreased remittances, negatively impacting the well-being of the elderly in Central Asia. Tracking remittance dynamics is difficult as much of it is not reflected in statistics. However, recent estimates suggest that the deceleration of the Russian economy might have heterogeneous effects on remittances sent to Central Asian countries (ADB, 2023), with serious downturns in some sectors and growth in others. Generally, it can be said that the welfare of the elderly in Central Asia remains dependent on remittances from Russia to a certain extent.
Impact of Labor Migration
The significant outmigration of youth and the working-age population from Central Asian countries produces a complex array of changes that, over time, tend to deteriorate the lives of the elderly population. As mentioned earlier, the outmigration of the working-age population from Central Asian states can be estimated in millions, leading to noticeable changes in regional demographics. As a result, the age structure in some areas with significant population outmigration becomes highly imbalanced in terms of gender and age structure, further deteriorating local economies and social life. Moreover, national economic policies in Central Asian states sometimes exacerbate regional inequalities, leading to additional outmigration. For instance, the propiska (obligatory residence permit) registration policy in Uzbekistan, inherited from the USSR system, prohibits migration to urban centers, forcing people to live and work in their native regions. This policy severely restricts internal migration, prompting people from areas with high unemployment to migrate abroad in search of jobs, often resulting in the massive migration of essential high-skilled specialists as well. For example, large-scale migration of medical specialists has been observed in many areas of Tajikistan due to low wages (Vasilyevich and Khasanovich, 2024). This led to a noticeable deterioration of the country's healthcare system, which has had the greatest impact on the elderly population, who require medical care the most.
Although labor migration from Central Asian countries is often a means of economic survival, this process frequently has a clear negative effect on the traditional social organization in these countries. The population of Central Asian countries, especially in rural areas, typically comprises traditional societies where the elderly play a key role in decision-making. The departure of youth from these complex networks of personal relationships disrupts traditional bonds, often affecting the elderly the most. With their children working thousands of kilometers away from home, the elderly gradually lose their emotional and socio-psychological connection with them, resulting in a loss of the traditional privileged position they used to enjoy within the social structure. In many cases, labor migration weakens the bonds between parents working abroad and their children left in their home country. When the children of migrant workers remain in their home country, they are usually left in the care of their elderly grandparents. Consequently, the elderly grandparents become the ones who bridge the generational gap. Raising grandchildren is quite challenging for the elderly both physically and psychologically (Ablezova et al., 2008). This profound shift highlights the multifaceted impact of labor migration, which not only affects economic stability but also erodes the traditional social fabric and intergenerational relationships in Central Asian societies.
Marginalization of the Elderly
With more than two decades of active labor migration from Central Asian countries, the elderly population has not only been marginalized in economic and socio-demographic dimensions, but also experienced regional marginalization. Regions with the poorest economies and highest unemployment rates are the primary sources of migrant workers (Cabar.asia, 2021). Over extended periods, economic marginalization of these regions relative to other parts of the country occurs without adoption and implementation of proper measures for harmonious regional development by central authorities. With the passage of time, the development of these partially depopulated regions becomes increasingly difficult due to the shortage of the working-age population. Many villages and small settlements in southern Kyrgyzstan and eastern Tajikistan exemplify this phenomenon. The governments of these countries have largely been unsuccessful in implementing policies that would stimulate development in the most underdeveloped parts of these nations. As a result, these settlements, typically small towns and villages, have become marginalized areas with predominantly elderly and sometimes predominantly female populations. As a result, the elderly population faces multiple problems in their daily lives related to infrastructural degradation, poor transportation, and limited access to healthcare, sanitation, and drinking water.
Kanat Makhanov is a research fellow at the Eurasian Research Institute. He is a PhD candidate at the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development. His current research is related to geography of population in post-Soviet countries with a particular focus on Kazakhstan.
For further information, please contact Kanat Makhanov, Eurasian Research Institute, ph +7 (727) 279 97 94, fax +7 (727) 279 24 26, e-mail: username1006@gmail.com; kanat.makhanov@eurasian-research.org). He can also be contacted at the University of Debrecen, ph (mobile): +36 70 346 9957, e-mail: kanat.makhanov@science.unideb.hu).
References
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Vasilyevich, R. S. and R. A. Khasanovich (2024). Emigration of medical personnel from Tajikistan abroad: Causes and consequences. Migration Letters, 21(4): 1755-1767, https://doi.org/10.59670/ml.v21iS68489.
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