The plaintiff applied for and obtained employment as a Guru Sandaran TidakTerlatih (‘GSTT’). After receiving her placement memo informing her of he rposting, she was asked to attend a briefing on the terms of her service of employment. At this briefing, the plaintiff was questioned as to whether she was pregnant. When the plaintiff admitted that she was three months pregnant, her placement memo was withdrawn. The plaintiff demanded that her employment as GSTT be restored but received no written reply. The plaintiff thus filed the present originating summons application against the education officers of the education office that was in charge of employing her (‘the first and second defendants’), the state director of the education department of Selangor at the material time ('the third defendant'), the Ministry of Education and the Government of Malaysia. The gist of the plaintiff's complaint was that the GSTT post was revoked and withdrawn by the defendants on the sole ground that she was pregnant. The plaintiff argued that this act of the defendants was tantamount to gender discrimination andthus against art 8(2) of the Federal Constitution ('the Constitution').

Court ruling:

The word ‘gender’ was incorporated into art 8(2) of the Constitution inorder to comply with Malaysia’s obligation under the Convention on the Elimination of all Form of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), to reflect the view that women were not discriminated. It is settled law that the CEDAW had the force of law and was binding on member states,including Malaysia. In interpreting art 8(2) of the Constitution it was the court's duty to take into account the government's commitment at an international level. As such, there was no impediment for the court to refer to CEDAW in interpreting art 8(2) of the Constitution. Applying arts 1 and 11 of CEDAW it was found that pregnancy in this case was a form of gender discrimination. It was a basic biological fact that only women had the capacity to become pregnant and thus discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was a form of gender discrimination. Hence it was found that the plaintiff should have been entitled to be employed as GSTT even if she was pregnant (see paras 20, 24, 28 & 32).

The defendants’ act of revoking and withdrawing the placement memo because the plaintiff was pregnant constituted a violation of art 8(2) of the Constitution. It was the contravention of the plaintiff's rights by the defendants as agents of the executive. However, there was no order as to costs because this was a public interest case (see paras 38–39).

https://www.loyarburok.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Noorfadilla-bt-Ahmad-Saikin-v-Chayed-bin-Basirun-Ors-2012-1-MLJ-832.pdf